Problem is the quality of shareholders.
I used to think this way as well, but on second thought I'd say the quality of voting people is nothing we can do about. The only way out is to design the incentive scheme in a such a way as to promote those who are better decision makers than the average shareholder. But I agree, it's a big challenge in a stake-based voting system, and I don't know how to do it. It seems to me that copying the corporate structure of power is the only way to go. On some level it saddens me to reach this conclusion but maybe this is the truth we need to face.
One way to solve low quality shareholder problem is obvious but not talked about (at least I haven't seen): let DAO have a right to confiscate shares from shareholders. If there was a bad situation where everything has stopped and nothing gets done, easiest solution would be, of course, to destroy the opposition. After the shares from opposition have been confiscated and redistributed/destroyed, DAO can work again.
In reality confiscation would be used very rarely, if ever. It would be enough if shareholders were aware of that possibility. Those who disagree would sell their shares before any bad conflict would arise.