I have been talking to pfunk about the history of the initial mine, and it was quite enlightening. What I decided to do, was basically, any account that has had any substantial amount of VESTS transferred to it, or used to create it, that trace back to those original 800,000 or so Steem tokens (which split, by the way, by 1000x or maybe more), will simply be deleted.
We do not want these people to easily be able to come back on, they will have to buy accounts to join. New users will have to pay also, and it will be a priority to implement a 'freemium' account that cannot have stake delegated to it until it reaches some amount of Stake. It would be nice to have this ready before going live, to be honest.
The deleted accounts current balances at the snapshot block, will be expressed in VESTS and this is the new JUICE currency. and become the initial rewards pool.
I am not aiming to do anything for the initial launch beyond simply removing things that don't belong or have no use. You can see that virtually every change is a removal of something. The sanitizing of the chain is going to be a 100% removal. But I think that putting that into the rewards pool is a big incentive and a mechanism that will help equilibriate, quickly, the true social-reputation tree, since, as I mentioned. This will be constrained by these following factors:
reputation scores, based on network total, divided into a range, reduce rewards allocation (thus zero or negative accounts cannot assign rewards until other users recover their reputation, by posting and being upvoted).
users cannot vote on their own posts directly
accounts will not activate without authorisation from a Captcha to unlock them. This will slow down botfarmers from being able to flood the network quickly with bot transactions
The whole purpose of having a powerdown liquidity limitation is precisely about restricting the change in in- versus out-flows of assets. Cryptocurrencies all tend to be too fast at this, and it makes margin trading impossible. Volatility is a bad thing in any currency.
A system like Steem depends on ongoing issuance rates, and it is a cost to holders of the tokens. Unlike simple currencies, there actually is a reason to keep issuing tokens indefinitely. Without this allocation, there cannot be rewards, and this is the very foundation of the concept. This is how it will, in the future, pay hosters of media and other files, this is how the providers of database query services will get paid.
I would suggest that your idea of what this kind of system is about, is not very clear or consistent, and probably tainted by what you know about non-digital and blockchain currencies, and perhaps also by a lack of knowledge about law/finance concepts like bills of exchange and property registries.
Like you say, a currency does not need additional issuance over time, at all. This is just a mechanism for exploitation by the issuers who have control over where it goes. This is controlled in a platform like this, by the collective will, the sum of everyone's votes, so this takes away the negative side of this, and makes it also, very important, that the rules governing the granting of this, by the regulators of the network (the witnesses, and indirectly, the developers, and in my scheme, this is driven by user demand, what these rules are), are strictly enforced, and consensual.
It is precisely the fact that there is so many rules in Steem, and so many of them are not consensual. You may contend that such rules cannot be consensual. I beg to differ. Except for maybe two or 3, the 10 commandments are axiomatically consensual. Thus, so shall it be for Calibrae. The rules will be as simple as possible, and as far as possible, enforced directly by the summation of the actions of users.
By this answer I concur that the worst of Steemit and STEEM's flaws are expected to remain in calibrae.
If an account got upvotes from a preminer, one of its proxies or one of its recursive benefactors, the effects of premining stay in tact in your platform.
If you charge people to join, you kill your platform before it is born.
Growing your community will be nearly impossible if you kept it free as in Steemit.
I could not find where you replied about Steemit's and calibr.ae's reward system having timeout on rewards, as opposed to dailymotion's and youtube's.
Why should a potential owner of a stake care about margin trading so much that he will agree to freeze his own's control over his stake?
I did not claim calibr.ae should reward posts upon viewing, nor does youtube works this way, and about dailymotion IDK enough regarding this aspect.
Youtube rewards upon ad viewed for longer than 15 seconds.
An upvote based system should rewards upon upvotes, which is fine, but there should be no time limit on rewarding upvotes.
This is what I meant before.
Regarding your joining stipulations, I failed to comprehend them.
Regarding what a substantial amount of rewards from a preminer, I disagree, since by doing so you both complicate matters and retain some of the problem you seem to be obsessed about.
Regarding margin, you do not convince me, since I do not believe that comfortability for margin traders should be a matter of highest regard when designing a currency system.
Youtube pays upon # of ads viewed for more than 15 secs, not on immediate views of the content itself.
Where is the contradiction?
So is youtube wrong when an uploader of an ATG video keeps ripping the rewards of his great work?
Limiting to 7 days and even 2 months incentives the spirit of spam that ruined Steemit and tsu.co.
There must be no time limit on rewards.
Choosing votes over the youtube criteria might still be fine, but must not be limited with time.
Youtube is a means of passive income while Steemit is a means of frequent creation of spam.
Obviously there is spam content on youtube and quality content on Steemit, but their corresponding part out of the wholes differ because of the difference in the rewarding systems.
Youtube will keep beating Steemit and everything similar to steemit or tsu because of it.
Your proposals are farther from abuse prevention than mine are, and I never claimed that my proposals are perfect against abuse, just better than Steemit and your proposals which are too similar to Steemit in most of its faults and even add a new fault or 2 and then some complication.
Not sure how the removal of pre-mining related accounts will remain objective, but I trust you'll publish the algorithm. I like the idea of preventing the receipt of delegation until an SP threshold is reached.
I really think you're providing a very valuable service whichever way it goes. Even if your progress only goads them into taking the appropriate steps for addressing the long-term good of the platform it will beneficial, and your work possibly of historical significance.