they are incentivized to go find some crappy smoothie recipe and vote on that instead
I doubt that anyone of those who are on the trending curators list by the curation score uses this method, vote for some random crap and hope for the better. Of course, it is an issue, but actually there's just a few dozen whales who are really incentivized to do so. But that problem could be solved through implementation of "internal rshares market", so any whale could just have a smoothie on the beach and collect interest for delegating her voting power without bothering with curation.
It was hyperbole to illustrate a point. The algorithm favors unvoted content over voted content far in excess of the difference in quality or user preferences, or more to the point in large part regardless of the gap between current expected (relative) payout and (relative) quality. In fact top curators must use something in principle similar to the method I described, just a somewhat less extreme version of it.
Just try to imagine the opposite
Something highly subjective, isn't it ?
Even more subjective
From my personal experience I never suffered much because of need to choose between "low-quality/high expected payout" and "high quality/low expected payout" because of having enough "high quality/high expected payout" options ( and somehow restricted amount of voting power , I don't really want it to sunk below 80% , if I start to play in "casino" I think it would go below 50% )
Anyway, I was never able to figure out why rshares market idea is something to be ignored, is there something I don't know about ?
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Not the way I'm using it. I'm taking the actual rewards produced by voting as the objective consensus of the user base as to the 'quality' or 'value' of the post (of course each voters' individual decisions are subjective). It is factually the case that later votes contribute to that value but receive little to no curation rewards. This directly incentivizes voting that diverges from objective consensus value. Larger payouts occur only because people ignore (lack of) curation rewards and vote anyway, but that doesn't change the fact that the curation rewards system directly discourages this and imposes a value system that demonstrably differs from that revealed by actual voter behavior.
The team seems to prefer the curation guilds idea, which could be seen as a form of rshares market, just a somewhat different take on it. Both ideas do have their downsides, however. I don't have a link but there was a good post and discussion on the risks and downsides of curation guilds a while back. Most of the same arguments against that idea would apply to other forms of rshares markets as well.
well, yes, the system rewards those who discovered quality and value of some particular post earlier ( and I guess it's how it supposed to be by design ) but those who discovered it a bit later are probably to much penalized.
I think the "taxation" for early voting before 30 min shouldn't be paid to author but rather somehow distributed to later curators instead...but I guess you would say that alone is not enough ?
As for curation guilds I've seen a lot of discussions. For me the biggest downside is that it is sort of "bureaucratic machine", once established it's difficult to shut it off. If I don't have any long term plans, just want to curate some particular event ( like Steemfest for example) it would be nice to have an opportunity "to borrow" a few millions SP for a few weeks for this purpose on some sort of internal market. I guess guilds and rshares market could coexist, there's no need to stick for just one option.