UBI (given strong identity) is actually not problematic in this way, assuming it's distributed fairly to everyone (and not just those who vote for it). If given to all unique participants in a flat manner, it actually acts as an anti-inflationary property, whereby it asymptotically flattens the wealth distribution. If done right, it's actually not a terrible solution to centralization of wealth -- but of course with other drawbacks.
For secret ballots, believe me, if it were trivially easy it would be done already. It's actually a pretty fun problem to try and think about how to do it and how to break it.
You can't just use a hash. Suppose Alice wants to vote for her 100 tokens for Bob. How do we prove 100 tokens voted for Bob without proving Alice was the one who did it -- while also ensuring Alice doesn't vote twice, or that she didn't move those tokens to a different account and vote there with the same tokens? How do we ensure Alice can't prove to Bob that she voted for him? How do we do all this in a deterministic way such that the whole public can verify the results and yet no one can prove who voted for who?
Oops. Thanks for setting me straight. This is why I should not be glib.
Also, the pic was not so much about UBI, as the imagery about kickbacks and voting. But, again, good point.
Thanks!
They are both actually interesting topics, so happy to have an excuse to talk about them!
Well, I always feel the urge to redeem myself after proving I am an imbecile. Because of this I involuntarily considered secret balloting in the back of my mind since you corrected me.
What if there's two hashes formed, one which pertains to the vote, confirming a vote based on the asset involved occurred, and one which inures to the asset itself, which the voting mechanism will not allow to vote again?
This is not quite trivial, but I suspect it is doable.
Sadly, just hashing certainly won't work. In my other comment I think this is a good summary of the real catch-22:
I must be missing something. I do not grasp why the SP cannot be assigned a hash that allows a) public verification that it has been used to vote - but not how it voted, b) prevents it being used to vote again for that election, and c) can either be used to change one's vote later, permitting 'liquid democracy' and folks to change their mind after discovering unsavory facts post-election, or terminate upon conclusion of the plebiscite.
A hash is fairly easy to construct that allows your item 1. Why is 2. even desirable?