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RE: On a Principled Approach to Blockchain Governance - 7 Requirements

in #eos8 years ago

@modprobe, i agree with you, and @iang

  • i'd add that it isn't really should there be a constitution or not, because "not" still implies how a group consitutes itself.
  • any design: governance model x, y, z, or "no" design at all is still a design choice. and by making this choice, you are already deciding governance.
  • org's, bodies, groups, systems, grow as a function of their design.
  • what at first may seem like chains of governance, may in the future be the means by which the system is preserved.
  • the question is what is it you wish to preserve, and if you hold it dearly, how do you ensure that you do that in a manner that befits the ideal.
  • consider this as analogy (lifted from a recent quanta magazine article): https://www.quantamagazine.org/how-heat-kills-cells

proteins seem as though they are rigid machines only able to perform one specific task, but they morph in times of need, so much, that it seems they are dying - instead they are fortifying and recombining in new ways to help their system grow.

the devil is in the details as much as in the lack of details (e.g. constitution vs no constitution).

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Fully agreed - and most blockchains have chosen "no consititution." And got into a mess because of it. One could also say that these experiments were just that - experiments to find out how far we can get without a constitution and what happens when something is needed. We can point to BIPs as examples of evolution in governance.

We can also design from the position of hindsight. And we can design to preserve the good while reducing the bad. That's what this series tries to do - hence the notion that we want a constitution that acts as a filtering device: "wot, you mean if I hack a contract and steal some money, it'll be clawed back? Nah, I'm going back to bitcoin where I can have more nefarious fun..."