I feel if we drastically reduce curation we are going to eliminate any incentive to power up. The majority of users already power down and sell as fast as they earn it. Very few will lock up any significant amount to just vote witnesses and proposals.
I don't think it eliminates any incentive to power up, although I agree it reduces it. It would probably make sense to reduce the powerdown time to 30 days at the same time as a counter-incentive.
But what I don't agree with is that "disincentivizing staking" = incentivizing selling. Staking just to create scarcity is just playing a game with people's heads, IMO.
I disagree, I think shitty auto voting is bad.
I agree with that. I just haven't seen a solution that just eliminates bad auto-voting.
The other problem is very few are downvoting to counter the shitty voting that goes on, which would be a balance to keep the auto voting in check.
I've also yet to see a decent proposal for how to make downvoting work well socially, unfortunately.
That's not what I meant but I can see how you got that as I put two thoughts together. My point is we have a large portion of users powering down on a regular basis and selling. Many see Hive as a weekly paycheck, and some depend on it as such.
My point wasn't that it would incentive it, just that it is an existing condition. If there is less incentive to power up (or even just not power down), it will likely happen less.
I'm not sure that's two different things. I feel like it's the same thing, just expressed two different ways. But maybe I'm still missing something.
The only way to eliminate auto voting is to reduce curation rewards if you constantly vote on the same author. For instance, you could add a curation multiplier (0-1) that is associated with time. If you haven't voted on an author for say 5 days your curation is multiplied by 1. If you have voted on the same author 10 times that day your multiplier is 0. The difference is burned or donated to the HPS.
Does that make sense? It overly complicated things, but gives you the voting behavior you are looking for. Although vote bots could be setup to get around that. That is always the case.
A sybil attack (voting with a rotating set of accounts) would be the easiest way to overcome this. So given the added complexity to implement the algorithm initially, and the relative ease of beating it, it's probably not worth doing. Plus it would incentivize a form of "bad" behavior (the sybil attack).
Agreed. I didn’t come to that conclusion until I was mostly done brainstorming the idea though :)
Split the stake between multiple accounts and factor in the curation (loss) multiplier when considering votes.
It would discourage large stakes from frequently dolloping large votes in the same place so they'll at least have to cast their net wider.