That's an interested idea with reducing vp to vote witnesses.
I feel it could lead to more centralization.
I think allowing people to vote for between 7 and 15 witnesses makes the most sense. Going to low makes it too easy for a group to block all changes in order to het their ideas passed. Another idea is to fix witness payment to hbd to give them a more certain income. Extra funding stuff or increased support when necessary can come from dao.
I will show the math of 1t1v.
If you have 1M Hive, and I have 100 Hive, you'd expect our influence on governance to differ by 999,900 Hive. If we each had one vote, that is how it would be. However we have 30 votes. So, you vote 30x and exert 30M Hive influence on governance, while I vote 30x and exert 3000 Hive influence on governance.
The difference between our stake is 999,900 Hive. The difference between our influence on governance under the current system is 29,997,000 Hive.
Given the above discussion of stake and influence on governance, I am unable to understand how making each token only able to vote once for governance could lead to centralization more than multiplying each 30x to make the tokens held by substantial stakeholders worth 30x more than tokens held by equals.
Can you explain please?
My pleasure =p
Currently one army (person group whatever) needs >50% of all hp to attack the Hive network. Thet will vote top 17~30 witnesses. There is nothing that can be done.
To elect 4 to stop a hardfork, an army also needs > 50%. Alternatively they could stop a necessary hardfork until they 'negotiate'. This is also called extortion (proxy.token helped justin do it).
If we have 1t1v, >85% ensures 17 top 20 witnesses and a certain hard fork. Its safer.
However >20% ensures 4 top 20 witnesses and blocking a hardfork until the extortion is paid. Its now 2.5× easier to do an extortion attack and well within the means of potential alliances.
Sure doing nothing or extortion is less severe than a rogue hardfork, but they could also wait until they find a critical exploit that desperately needs patching before acting. We could experience this before and after every hardfork.
We could change the amount of consensus witnesses from 17/20 to 11~12/20 to address this issue. Or require 51~70/100. In anycase the entire equation needs to be rebalanced if the vote weights change to prevent a blockage attack.
I appreciate the substantive reply. I don't agree that blocking a HF is centralization of governance, however.
What I do agree on is that it appears that using stake alone to influence governance seems to be impossible to secure against both vectors for attack. There's far too many financial assets available to known censors for any mechanism based on financial assets alone to prevent censors from imposing greater stake on Hive.
I have become convinced that those that are advocating adding rep, or some other metric, to stake to effect governance are on the right track. I'd very much like to hear more discussion of means of preventing stake alone from being able to effect governance, because with that system in place, all that prevents those better funded censors from undertaking to destroy Hive as Steem has now been is the effort to do so.
Thanks!