In the Middle East, the Iran vs Saudis is an unresolved rivalry that flares occasionally. Saudi Arabia views Iran as an existential threat for the Kingdom and there is merit in that assessment if one considers the Kingdom structured as it is now. Saudis historically looked for allies to engage Iran. Before losing the Western support, Iraq under Saddam’s war was a part of this pawn engagement.
Israel on the other hand does not have a problem with Iran per se but with the mullah regime in particular. As such, Israel would like Iran to be a balancer in the region but preferably following a regime change. This position initially is similar to Saudis but would differ in the derivative where the Saudis would seek ultimate reduction in the power of the Iranian state regardless of whoever is in power. Israel on its own part is right in perceived risk both due to the increasing encroachment of Iran through its increased influence in Israel’s neighbors and due to missile risks.
Iran is aware of Saudi & Israeli intentions and is trying to move the conflict away from home turf to the rivals’ immediate surroundings such as Yemen and Syria. Iran’s regime rightly feels threatened by this regional setup and understandably responds in covert operations, militia build up and proliferation of region through economic and political influence. Therefore, Iran is probably in the thick of a lot of activity but not the nuclear sort. In a stylized scenario, Iran would have a regime change, befriend Israel, mute the US and bandwagon with EU. Since this is not a storybook, the first condition does not materialize which makes the other precedents quite hard. Yet again as with the others, let’s credit that Iran has legitimate threat concerns as well.
Enter the US, which historically seemed to understand these dynamics and acted as a balancer at times, now siding actively with the Saudi-Israeli position. The economics of this move would undoubtedly have an effect on Iran but that’s not unprecedented. What is more risky is the potential of a physical confrontation, intervention, bombing or outright war. Some of this would happen because there are many trigger potentials and the Syrian theater for all to prove. Which, when and with what intensity is hard to ascertain now.
There is one missing physical aspect of the Saudi-Israeli angle — ideally, there has to be another Saddam that would provide ground forces to really hit Iran hard. Without such power, why are they escalating the engagement? Because the escalation will not have the desired effect in Iran, this seems inadequate. I think that this point is well known to all actors involved and the intention might not be to go for short order regime change in Iran. The intention is probably to relieve pressure on Saudis as they go on with their reform and consolidation program and to create enough of a buffer for Israel from Iranian influence. Regime change or not is not the immediate goal and as such ground troop engagement is not a factor. However, with so many players on the ground with both competing and overlapping interests, actual dynamics on the ground is hard to fathom. What is clear is that the risk level in the Middle East has notched up with the US pulling out of the nuclear deal.
May 2018