And that happens, the @curangel delegators go after those mostly. Problem there is that this causes a lot of retaliation flags. Our delegators are shielded, so it's the compilation posts that get the main part (and are routinely greyed out on the main interfaces). A few used their personal ones, and are targets now too.
Unfortunately that holds a lot of people off from joining the effort. I try to push the idea that "they can't downvote everyone", but with very little success. That's why I would prefer a solution built into code.
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Unfortunately I'm pretty certain that hard core abusers (we all know who they are) will evade it using various round robin combinations of accounts, as well as stake moving (which can be done invisibly every 13 weeks, which is probably enough to stay ahead of detection, almost entirely if not entirely), while innocent non-evasive users and valuable contributions which should be perfectly legitimately be consistently rewarded over time will be caught by it, so I can't support the sorts of ideas I've seen proposed, but I can't rule out there might be others that could work.
13 weeks to move the stake are a long time, I was thinking about something going into effect in a shorter time. But yes, balancing it in a way that doesn't hurt valid rewards too much while still affect switching accounts would be difficult, and trying to enforce a culture of constantly looking for other authors to reward could backfire by annoying users.
I definitely do not feel like I could come up with a working system, so for now it's just a slight hope that keeping the idea around leads to someone else doing so. Until then we'll unfortunately have to live with the situation that those battling the abuse do that with a personal cost.
I hope this part of the community has the longer breath than the ones who deserve their rewards to be reduced.
I didn't mean that moving stake would be the only evasion, but using various accounts in a round robin nature to obscure the relationships would be enough to evade, temporarily, for 13 weeks, and then after that a whole new set of accounts could be used.
Anyway, I'm probably long term bearish on the global reward pool so I hope we can see all of these measures including the minnow-hurting low-end curve as temporary stop gaps until we can move to community-specific pools which can decide on whatever sets of rules (at least within allowable parameters) that work for them, not trying to force one approach onto everyone.