My statement is a conceptual one, not an empirical one. It simply states that, within a logical framework, two given concepts are consistent with each other. To ask for proof of the realization of a given concept in reality is a misleading way of not addressing the logical issue that is actually addressed in my statement.
Regarding your example, it doesn't provide, as asked, a clear definition of the concept of free will. It simply illustrates an interaction process which modulates the accessible choices and their likelihoods, not an elimination of all alternatives except for one necessary consequence. I urge you to provide a definition of free will in order for us to establish a common basis of understanding.
Definition: Free will is the assumption that human beings can take actions or make decisions independent of environmental stimuli
I thank you for providing this definition.
If I take that definition of free will then I agree completely that it does not exist. The existence of such a form of free will would be the same as saying that human beings are of a metaphysical nature, completely disconnected from everything else. It would be a self-evident nonsense.
Humans and their minds are physical processes which are in constant interaction with their surroundings. Besides that, being composite systems, a human being's several constituent parts also interact among each other. Interactions form causal structures along the evolution of systems. These very basic concepts underlie the entirety of our scientific understanding of the universe.
I would, however, propose a different definition of free will, one which might actually be subject to a meaningful discussion. While it is an evident truth that actions and decisions are causally influenced, through interactions, by a number of internal and external states of affairs, I argue that the structure of such causal relations may not be deterministic in nature, but rather probabilistic. This hypothesis is grounded on the observation that, at its core, reality does not seem to follow causal determinism.
The question I would then posit is: given a certain action or decision taken by a human agent, is it a unique necessary consequence of preexisting conditions, or just one among a causally consistent set of possibilities? For me, this constitutes the real open question regarding any sort of free will, which I would define as human agency and volition, as a system, having a consistent room of possibilities to evolve into, instead of a single necessary consequence.
Stating that no absolute freedom exists in the physical world seems to me like stating that the sky is blue. I will appreciate your comments on my observations.
I think Sam Harris can answer your question much better.
I agree that "our neural physiology is going to give rise to every next thought and intention that shows up". This guy is cleverly pointing out important causal structures underlying agency and volition. He does not, however, discuss the quality of the causal structure, implicitly assuming a simple causal deterministic nature for it.
Also, I agree that "if I can predict what you're going to do before you're aware of what you're going to do, then the basis for free will seems to go out the window". However, for this to be really persuasive as a definitive objection to free will, it had be true for any conceivable action or thought. Many of our states of mind may run on some kind of autopilot, mainly for efficiency and evolutionary reasons, but that is not the same as saying that there is no room for different possibilities when a conscious process of consideration is undertaken by a subject.
Sam Harris illustrates his point by talking about the Libet experiment (or some version of it), which pertains to predicting an extremely simple action with only two possibilities by construction. While it is a groundbreaking experiment into the complex interplay between neural network configurations and mind states, it can't be taken, in such a simple form, as a strong statement against any form of free will. Furthermore, you should be aware of the many philosophers who provide good reasons for dismissing Libet's experiment as evidence against free will, namely Daniel Dennett, criticizing not only the conceptual interpretation of the results, but also the experimental setup. Only an ability to fully reproduce a deterministic causal chain between neurological processes and mind states would constitute convincing evidence. I'm not saying that there is no deterministic causal chain; I'm just saying we're not in a position to affirm that there is.
I didn't watch the movie till the end. I'd like to read what YOUR thoughts, not Sam Harris. And please, don't insist on the idea that we, as physical objects, and subject to causal influences stemming from interactions between our constituent systems and between ourselves and our surroundings. My question is about the causal modality of these interactions, not whether they exist or not. I'm 100% with you in that respect. Now, does this causation have to be in the form of causal determinism?
There is room for all kinds of possibilities. The question is how you label some as solely yours and not just a by-product of something else?
Taking into consideration the basic fabric of human perception, I believe it is. If a cup of warm coffee for example can have such a statistical significance in perceiving someone else more "warm" then consider how marketing guys use the same tricks or how the power of suggestion plays out in dating.
Even basic psychological tricks in regards how to deal with family, friends, bad situations, demonstrate how volatile our minds are and how they all bounded by causal determinism. Sure, nothing is 100% but it is rather evident that causal determinism is the rule and not the exception. We use very simple patterns in our daily lives because we are very susceptible to symbolism. Uniforms are a very good example. Height. Skin Color..etc
Regarding the first part of your comment, I'm not sure what you mean by "solely yours" and how it pertains to the softer concept of free will which I provided as context for my questions. We do not exist in a vacuum, and I thought we had already got over that issue. Being subject to stimuli, both intrinsic and extrinsic, and weighting those in the process of decision making does not entail neither causal determinism nor ultimate lack of room for choice. Perhaps we might discuss further on the details of how choices are made, but let's not come back to the fact that they are constrained by a number of causal relations, as I believe anything is from a physical perspective.
As for the examples of marketing and psychology tricks which are used, sometimes to a great degree of success, to manipulate people, these do not constitute evidence for causal determinism for the simple reason that you cannot deterministically predict the effect a given trick will have on a given person. The success of these methods is statistical in nature, which is to say that, when applied to a large group of people, an appreciable percentage will respond in the intended way. This is much more similar to the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics than to the causal determinism of classical physics. Causal determinism can't be "the rule" if the effect obeys to a statistical distribution and not a single, deterministic response.
I believe you might argue that each individual's biological set up and personal history will be different and thus will develop a different response to the manipulation attempt. And I would totally agree with you. But this observation adds nothing to the question of whether a given person which is subjected to some kind of mind trick is bound to answer in just one very well defined way or rather has a set of options which are available to him or her. This is the key to distinguish between causal determinism and stochastic determinism: given all the constraints, are there several options for the system to evolve into, or just one?
Regarding our proclivity for discerning patters, I believe its origin is twofold. On one hand, there is a clear evolutionary advantage for one to be able to quickly recognize in the environment potential sources of nourishment or danger, and in a next step to generalize from common features among these things to predict whether a new element in the environment is likely to constitute an opportunity or a threat. This mechanism gave rise to concepts of categorization, but also of prejudice. Then, when pattern recognition evolved to more abstract concepts, we essentially started Mathematics, which is above everything else the study of patterns. As a tool, Mathematics has shown us that there are high level regularities in the way the universe works, reinforcing our tendency to lean on pattern recognition as an especially useful and powerful tool to navigate the world.
Now patterns come in all sizes and shapes; and while the trajectory of a projectile, for example, seems to always follow a parabola in a completely deterministic fashion, the trajectory of an electron follows a completely different pattern (rigorously, it isn't even well defined for most of the time). Again, the existence of patterns is not evidence of causal determinism; different kinds of patterns may arise from different kinds of causal structures. I do not object to the existence of patterns in human psychology and behavior; I just doubt that these constitute proof of determinism.
Given a well defined set of preexisting conditions, can a given person respond in different ways or not? This is the question that we are faced with, and neither Libet's experiments nor marketing tricks indicate clearly that no set of options is available.
same applies to everything else really. Remember. You can't prove a negative aka that free will does not exist. You first need to provide evidence that it does. I think it is impossible for the very reason you yourself mentioned.