Descartes' Theory of Freedom

in #philosophy • 8 years ago (edited)

Despite explicit passages in Descartes’ writing that paint his theory of freedom as libertarian, Descartes theory of freedom is more accurately interpreted as compatibilist.

Challenge

Plentiful explicit textual evidence points toward Descartes being a libertarian. Expressions such as the ones below give tangible momentum to this view. “[T]he ability to do or not to do something” (CSM II:40) and “the will is by its nature so free that it can never be constrained” (Passions of the Soul, I, art. 41)

Wouldn’t that imply that when his readings hint towards compatibilism, it is more of a fluke, or an inconsistency in communication, rather than a more accurate representation of his theory of freedom?

I disagree. In this paper I will demonstrate why, despite explicit libertarian claims, Descartes is better understood as a compatibilist.

Significance

The thesis’ importance lies in clarifying the progress that was made in a pivotal moment in Philosophical history. This can help to settle disagreements that were caused by building on Descartes’ work. It also helps identify whether Descartes was responsible for a significant deviation in thought from scholasticism. Lastly, Descartes unique version of freedom (as we will determine in this paper) can help us learn about freedom in a general sense.

Compatibilism vs Libertarianism

Libertarianism is the counter position to compatibilism because they take opposite stances on the question of whether free will is compatible with determinism. The debate derives fuel from the compatibilist’s attempt to consolidate libertarian intuitions while having the ability to introduce a scientifically attractive picture at the same time. As libertarianism is an indeterminist theory, textual evidence that supports determinism will be taken to support compatibilism and vice versa.

Collins’ interpretation

Collins’ paper, “Adding Substance to the Debate: Descartes on Freedom of the Will”, published in 2013, includes one of the most up-to-date interpretations of Descartes’ theory of freedom.

Collins argues that if we draw an analogy between Descartes’ views on substance and freedom, the ‘upshot’ is that his account of substance furthers the compatibilist view. (Collins, 219). He emphasizes that Descartes dismisses intellectual determinism, while pushing that “Descartes’ compatibilist understanding of human freedom stems from an acceptance of theological determinism” (Collins, 218). This means to accommodate a deterministic account of the world that does not have a hold on the human mind. And combined with Descartes’ belief in a free will, as introduced at the start of this paper, his theory of freedom is best read as compatibilist.

Descartes’ definition of freedom

Because I start the process of sorting out Descartes’ theory of freedom by presenting reasons for a compatibilist interpretation, we should take a step back to look at how Descartes’ makes explicit claims in favor of libertarian freedom. His definition of free will is most noticeable as a starting point.

[T]he will, or freedom of choice…simply consists in our ability to do or not do something (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid); or rather, it consists simply in the fact that when the intellect puts something forward for affirmation or denial or for pursuit or avoidance, our inclinations are such that we do not feel we are determined by any external force." (CSM II.40, from Collins, 228)

While “our ability to do or not do something” pushes an indeterminist view of freedom, and “... such that we do not feel we are determined by any external force” are the key statements to focus on. This reminds of libertarianism because to have the “... ability to do or not do something” cannot be the case in a deterministic world (ibid). So Descartes’ belief in freedom, combined with these indeterminist notions, make the libertarian reading attractive.

This idea is furthermore supported by the claim that “[Descartes] cannot complain that the will or freedom of choice which [he] received from God is not sufficiently extensive or perfect, since [he knows] by experience that it is not restricted in any way” (CSM II.39). Collins agrees that “[t]his is in line with a libertarian understanding of freedom which holds that freedom is incompatible with determinism” (Collins, 219). Where his notion of libertarian freedom comes from Ragland’s 2006 paper ‘Descartes on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities’.

And lastly, Lili Alanen furthers that Descartes advocates the view that “[t]he point that seems important for Descartes is that whatever our actual volitions are, we could, at some point, have opted not to elicit them and so willed otherwise—for instance, we could have chosen, deliberately, to ignore the pursuit of the true and the good in order to gratify some desire of the moment” (Alanen, p. 193).

So the libertarian reading has at least two instances of explicit statements in its support, with two commentators who underline these statements’ weight.

“Or-Rather” complication

JPT, an OSU graduate student, in the paper “Descartes on Human Freedom: Indifference or Spontaneity”, points out an issue in the definition of the will given above. He concedes that most commentators accept that Descartes view of the will is synonymous with his view of human freedom, which is necessary to interpret the claims above as being in favor of libertarianism. But he also emphasizes that the inclusion of the words “or rather” between “... our ability to do or not do something” and “... not ... determined by any external force” implies that these are different conceptions of freedom (CSM II.40, from Collins, 228). The first being referred to as “liberty of indifference” while the second embodies a “liberty of spontaneity”. (JPT, Indifference or Spontaneity)

This confusion is relevant because I state above that these statements give motion to a libertarian interpretation. So for these definitions of freedom to be inconsistent undermines them as a significant representation of Descartes’ view.

“Or-Rather” not a problem

Fortunately for the proponent of the libertarian reading, commentators like Ragland and Alanen who have attempted to digest this distinction conclude that ‘the freedom to be found in the second clause … can be explained in terms of the type of freedom described in the first clause.” (ibid) Meaning that the ‘or-rather’ complication does not cause these statements lose weight because they can be considered harmonious to the point of avoiding inconsistency.

Definition has room for compatibilism

Although the “Or-Rather” complication is not enough to undermine Descartes’ explicit libertarian statements, the proponent of the compatibilist reading will respond that even if we grant Descartes’ libertarian claims, his definition of free will is still too vague to confidently peg him as such.

That his definition doesn’t explicitly address whether he considers the illusion of choice enough for freedom seems like the easiest route for the compatibilist to take. Note that Descartes uses the words “feel [that] we are determined” (CSM II.40). He seems to take his perception as the basis of his evidence for free will. But if his view of free action depends only on our perception of said action, then there is more than enough room for the compatibilist to pry open this seemingly libertarian devotion.

Compounding definition with more claims

Although Descartes’ definition of freedom is too vague to be confidently interpreted as condoning libertarianism, there are more claims, that when compounded with his definition, make understandable the possibility of interpreting his stance as libertarian freedom.

For starters, Descartes’ will is spontaneous. As he explicitly writes: “the will is by its nature so free that it can never be constrained” (Passions of the Soul, I, art. 41)

Furthermore, in the Fourth Meditation, Descartes claims that our will, which is the faculty which he attributed free will to, came straight from God. He concedes, however, that human error cannot come from God because that would demonstrate imperfection, which by definition is not God. So according to the structure of his view, God does not have deterministic hold over the will, because that would attribute him with imperfections that Descartes deems illogical (JPT, Indifference or Spontaneity). We can see here a great effort on Descartes’ behalf to avoid a compatibilist picture. He makes clear his belief that God cannot be responsible for our every move.

Deterministic metaphysics

Although the above points introduce writing that pull Descartes’ theory of freedom into the libertarian park, they are still not immune from a compatibilist reinterpretation. There are primary sources that go the opposite direction and explicitly support a deterministic account of the will.

“[...] Philosophy by itself is able to discover that the slightest thought could not enter into a person's mind without God's willing, and having willed from all eternity, that it should so enter […] God is the universal cause of everything in such a way as to be also the total cause of everything; and so nothing can happen without his will.” (CSMK 272, from Collins, 219)

But Descartes, in at least one instance, resists God’s hold over humans. This seems odd because it directly contradicts the statement above. Notice, however, that by saying that “the slightest thought could not enter into a person’s mind without God’s willing” (ibid), Descartes concedes that God’s deterministic hold extends to the human mind. This undermines his advocacy of libertarianism because he diffuses the required divide between God’s hold on the mind. Even dualism is not enough for Descartes’ to cohere his idea of freedom with his attribution of a deterministic mind.

Occasionalism

But God’s influence on the human mind still has room for indeterminism. A proponent of reading Descartes as a libertarian would here argue for an occasionalist picture. If “... the slightest thought could not enter into a person’s mind without God’s willing” (Letters to Elizabeth, p. 314), then God’s will could be to give us the thoughts that we desire. In that case, God still will’s our very thought, while still giving us a chance to choose what he should will. And indeed, some commentators argue that “... Descartes did hold occasionalist views with regard to extended substances, or bodies. In other words, according to these interpreters, Descartes denied that bodies acted on either bodies or other minds”. (Lee, SEP)

Occasionalism absurd

Upon further inspection an attempt to attribute Descartes with occasionalist views does not give room for a compatibilist reading. After all, how can God make us have any new thoughts when he requires us to have new thoughts to give us new thoughts? It’s hard to see how that structure could be productive at all.

Furthermore, ascribing Descartes with occasionalist views is under steady contention (ibid), which already implies that this avenue is unlikely to help us progress. The textual evidence in favor of Descartes’ occasionalist inclination does not address his view on the relationship between God and the mind. So to use that as a counter-argument against his statement on the deterministic relationship between the mind and God is more a suggestion of a possibility than an allusion to his documented views. So to try and use an occasionalist interpretation to push a libertarian reading of Descartes's theory of freedom ultimately falls short.

Receding libertarian

At this point it seems clear that the libertarian is forced to concede ground. Descartes theory of freedom includes determinism to such a degree that it can’t be interpreted as full-fledged libertarianism. But it still looks like the combination of Descartes’ libertarian claims and his determinist remarks are not all in agreement with a compatibilist reading. Descartes’ recognition of varying degrees of freedom (JPT, Schmalz) also implies a weak stance towards an essential component of libertarianism.

In light of this, the libertarian is primed to hold to a more modest form of libertarianism. What this could mean is open to several possibilities. But what Gregg Caruso refers to as Honderich’s near-determinism, or determinism-where-it-matters, is a suitable starting point (Caruso, 3).

Receding libertarian fails

But the ‘modest’ reinterpretation becomes much less attractive from another angle. After all, it doesn’t matter how close to libertarianism a compatibilist view is. Any interpretation that contains a sliver of coherent determinism forces the worldview to be compatibilist. The mere coexistence of these prima facie opposites necessarily implies compatibilism, even if one is far more pronounced than the other. Admitting any instance of determinism opens up a door that can’t be closed, because as long as there is evidence of free will in the presence of determinism, compatibilism must necessarily be the case. Even modest libertarianism as a view is too strict and lacking in room for determinism for it to be reasonable to put Descartes, somebody who toyed wildly with deterministic notions, in that park.

Unimpeded action There is more textual evidence to compound the above point against the adherence to a less strict form of libertarianism.

“... the more I incline in one direction—either because I clearly understand that reasons of truth and goodness point that way, or because of a divinely produced disposition of my inmost thoughts—the freer is my choice” (CSM I.40)

Here Descartes emphasizes that we are most free when in accordance with clear and distinct perceptions (Woods). In doing so, he pushes a view of freedom that is closer to unimpeded action than spontaneous freedom. That is, Descartes appears to lean towards the side of liberty of indifference more than liberty of spontaneity. And to see freedom as unimpeded action supports compatibilism over libertarianism.

No deception

As we find that the textual evidence is rather inconsistent in showing what Descartes’ overarching metaphysical stance is, we should allude to more general strategies that are found in his writing. As descartes explains in great detail why it is that God is not deceiving us throughout the Meditations, it should be safe to assume that this is more integral to his philosophy than his considerations of freedom. But when combining the idea that God is not a deceiver with Descartes statements that advocate libertarian free will and determinism, then aren’t we left with a situation where we necessarily have to dismiss one or the other to avoid contradiction? After all, for both statements to be true just as they are stated seem to require deception on God’s behalf. And if forced to drop either side, libertarianism is easier to let go because attributes of God’s nature should be more important than attributes of our will.

Descartes’ theory of freedom

Now that notable attempts of libertarian readings of Descartes’ writing have failed, the question of how to best interpret Descartes’ compatibilism takes center stage. After all, it is unreasonable to criticise the libertarian reading for lack of textual evidence and clarity when the compatibilist interpretation could be subject to the same fault.

My thought is that that the following excerpt suggests a demonstration of a classical compatibilist theory of freedom.

”Descartes says that if we consider simply our own experience, and do not consider our nature in light of the larger context in which God is said to determine the universe, we find that we are free (AT VII 191; CSM II 134)” (Smith, 89).

And as this claim takes the shape of an overarching metaphysical stance, we should now be confident that his compatibilist claims override Descartes’ libertarian views of freedom.

Epistemological concern

Unfortunately, there is another way to explain the various contradictions between Descartes’ statements on freedom. Namely, that Descartes might not have formed a consistent theory after all, and that this is why his statements contradict each other. We find out in his various correspondences that he is caught writing that the apparent inconsistencies between free will and the power of God is something that he does not know how to solve:

“just as the knowledge of the existence of God should not take away our certainty of the free will which we experience and feel in ourselves, so also the knowledge of our free will should not make us doubt the existence of God” (Letters to Elizabeth, p. 314).

We can see that when specifically confronted, Descartes defends by claiming that the answer is out of epistemological reach.

Conclusion

I have gone through multiple accounts of textual evidence on both sides of the debate. At first it seems like the textual evidence for either side leads to a stalemate. I demonstrate this by hedging Collins’ interpretation against textual evidence for the libertarian reading. I then introduce textual evidence for a compatibilist reading as an attempt to diffuse this tension. As both sides still contradict each other, I then introduce arguments from secondary sources to see which of Descartes’ passages should be given more weight. I allude to the “Or-Rather” complication, Descartes’ deterministic metaphysics and unimpeded action to further the compatibilist stance. Even though I try to retaliate in favor of the libertarian reading by attempting to accommodate the compatibilist evidence under a libertarian framework by use of occasionalism and a less strict form of libertarianism, I ultimately conclude that Descartes’ devotion to a lack of deception shows that his theory of freedom is best interpreted as compatibilist.

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