You are viewing a single comment's thread from:

RE: Making Steemit Better: A Proposal to Flatten the Rewards Curve

in #steem8 years ago

TL;DR: I support this.

Long version:

First caveat: In this new scenario, there will be more posts getting a more balanced amount of rewards. Subsequently, as the rewards are getting evenly distributed, authors may start to post more content, to generate more income. In an ideal word, this would be quality content. We don't live in an ideal world. So the probability for spam increases under this model, since the incentive is bigger (until now, spam was "discouraged" because of low chances to get voted by whales). Maintaining the cap on the number of posts which can receive rewards, which is 4 now, AFAIK, should be enforced.

Second caveat: In this scenario, collusive voting behavior can generate more financial reward, so guilds may start to exert more power. I don't see this as either good or bad, just something that we should account for, one way or another.

If any of my two caveats is wrong or far fetched, please let me know how. We're in this together.

Thank you for the time spent in finding a new model, debating it and run the simulations.

Sort:  

I can only speak to my personal experience/opinion of being a Steem Guild member. The reason I whole-heartedly endorsed this proposal is because it will decrease the need for Steem Guild. Right now, Steem Guild members spend a lot of time and energy ensuring that hundreds of quality content creators earn some rewards for their contribution to the community. The goal is to retain as many creators as possible while encouraging them to continue to produce quality content. We currently help to reward approximately 400 content creators. If the rewards become less "top heavy", far more than 400 creators can earn significant rewards without the Guild's intervention. I have always said that I will throw a giant virtual party when the Guild is no longer needed. If this proposal is implemented, I think I will need to start figuring out how exactly to throw a virtual party.

If the rewards become less "top heavy", far more than 400 creators can earn significant rewards without the Guild's intervention.

But then another potential "Guild" can step in and aggregate another community of curators, which will redistribute the newly assigned rewards.

It only seems logical that, if more authors will receive more significant rewards, there will be more at stake. I didn't say "the guilds will increase in influence" with some sort of a judgement, like this will be either "bad" or "good". I just observed the possibility that new communities of curators can aggregate again, because there will be a more even surface of play. How this will tilt the balance, it's still something to be determined, IMHO.

Excellent point. Perhaps this will work like the entire system. Instead of a couple of large guilds, there will be many small ones. That would still help with the desired effect. Instead of rewarding 400 content creators, 4000 would be rewarded... or more. But you are correct, like everything here, we would have to wait and see the effect and then come up with another tweak if needed.

I agree. I think the role of Guild would be changed to "make posts beyond discount range". E.g. given 400 MVESTS discount, 3000 MVEST voting (about 1/3 of current Steem Guild voting) will make posts have about 90% linearity while it gives a post $7~8. If the discount is lowered under 100, 1000 MVEST voting would be enough to make posts attractive.

Second caveat: In this scenario, collusive voting behavior can generate more financial reward, so guilds may start to exert more power. I don't see this as either good or bad, just something that we should account for, one way or another.

this is incorrect. It would actually generate less. Additional users "piling on" would see diminishing (instead of exponentially increasing) returns. The curve becomes more linear as the support grows.

Incidentally, your first caveat is somewhat suppositious. You could make as compelling an argument that people would be inclined to spam low quality posts as a way of buying a "lottery ticket" at a chance for one exceptionally high paying post. The only system where there would not be a perceived incentive for posting more was one where there was no perception that the posts has any chance of getting rewarded at all.... which would obviously be a bad one.