2 is interesting but disinterested idle accounts would end up accumulating a good deal of the vesting inflation pie for being passive. Would that be a good thing? I don't think it would.
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2 is interesting but disinterested idle accounts would end up accumulating a good deal of the vesting inflation pie for being passive. Would that be a good thing? I don't think it would.
I think you have to choose your poison here. Whale accounts being active may well be worse for the system than them being passive. If that is the case, it makes perfect sense to reward the passive.
There's one other potential poison with the idea. Making vesting rewards superlinear would also act in favor of more concentration (or if you look at the other way, act in opposition to current efforts toward a more even distribution)
Granted, if the whales who all this power was concentrated in weren't voting, that would ameliorate some of the negative effects of high levels of steem concentration. But some (for instance, hesitance of new investors due to the fear of being dumped on) would be unaffected by this abstinence.
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They are in practice somewhat superlinear because rewards are, and curation rewards are 25% of post rewards (ignoring reverse auction).
Simplified example would be someone with 1 million SP votes on an unvoted post and generates a $4 post value, so $1 in curation. If someone else with 100 000 SP votes on an unvoted post under the same reward pool conditions, that would generate a 0.04 post value, and 0.01 in curation.
In reality it isn't anywhere near this extreme, but the effect persists.
Maybe, maybe not. In looking at incentives you have to consider that those accounts could become non-idle at any time and begin earning curation rewards and contributing to increased concentration (which as you point out has happened). So ensuring that even currently-idle accounts have a incentive to stay idle (and considering what would happen to concentration if they didn't under each alternative) is an important consideration.
Curation rewards are already superlinear (and very harshly so at the mid-low level where they often round down to zero). I'm not really proposing anything that isn't neutral with respect to distribution at the direct level of curation rewards vs. whatever you get for not curating, and it might on the whole be a net positive for distribution if a wider and flatter base of voting influence means that a wider range of content is rewarded (and less is skimmed by "guilds" and other such schemes).
Quoting myself with emphasis added:
I hadn't actually looked at the equation for curation rewards. I was under the impression that they were based on SP, but linearly so (and i missed the parenthetical statement to the contrary when i replied).
If theyre already superlinear then yeah it would be (or at least could) be distribution neutral. Though, both curation rewards and vesting rewards in the new system would probably have to be less superlinear than curation rewards are now.
Because the extra concentration caused by superlinear vesting rewards to idle accounts like ben and dan (up until a couple weeks ago) would have to be counterbalanced.
So true.