Hi @troglodactyl i will give it a shot.
point 1. Downvotes should get curation rewards
I have been subjected to attack simply for disagreeing with people here with severe loss of rep.
I have seen other people be attacked for extended periods of time for NO valid reason.
I have seen whales make stupid up votes with alt accounts to justify their down voting behavior.
Due to the nature of the rewards NOT being distributed in a linear fashion, it seems their is an incentive for big reward pool miners to promote Flag wars. I suspect that the recent and probably ongoing saga regarding a certain whale upvoting one account consistently is being done to justify flagging wars. All the better if you tap into people subconscious pain from past injustices and use their vote power right? especially if i am going profit from my reward pool mining operations.
point 2. There should be curation penalties for losing voting wars.
Given that most of the flag wars posses all the integrity and validity of a witch hunt this thinking blows my mind
point 3. Increase the length of the vesting schedule.
The whales promoting flag wars are the abusers in most cases.
point 4. Return to a non-linear reward curve.
from what i have been told the reward curve is non-linear and favors the big accounts reward pool mining operations.
Thanks for the explanation.
It sounds like the common element in all your reasoning is that you don't trust stakeholders to act in ways that support growth. This is a legitimate problem, but nerfing stakepower won't solve it. It's not just large stakeholders who try to abuse the network for profit, and as long as it remains profitable we'll see an increasing number of people taking that approach.
To solve the problem we can either try to fork the network removing the stake of large abusive stakeholders until the network is controlled by only the most angelic among us (unlikely), or we can modify the economics to make abuse unprofitable. I'm promoting the second approach. All stakeholders hold stake, which means they're united in the positive-sum benefit that comes from long term network growth. The problem is that they're divided by the short term zero-sum competition for rewards. To make the network healthy we need to make that zero-sum competition less appealing/profitable and the positive sum collaboration relatively more appealing.
Networks and societies always require trust, it's just a matter of how much we can distribute and manage that trust to make sure the costs of being untrustworthy are high and the rewards of being trustworthy are attractive. We obviously want to avoid having to trust people to act in our interests at the cost of their own.